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We develop a calibrated general equilibrium model of a small open economy to 
examine some macroeconomic and distributional effects of an aging population. The 
model features overlapping generations with a public pension system, asymmetric 
information in the labor market, and includes some households that are liquidity 
constrained. Our main results are as follows. First, by analyzing the consequences of 
population aging in one country without taking into account the extent of aging 
throughout the world, one may systematically misestimate the effect which aging may 
have on that country’s living standards and its net foreign asset position. Second, the 
magnitude of the effect of an aging population on people's average living standards, 
both in the short run and in the long run, significantly depends on whether or not they 
are liquidity constrained. Third, whether increases in contribution rates to finance the 
public pension system (as the elderly dependency ratio rises) are imposed on workers or 
firms has little effect on the impact of aging on living standards; however, it does matter 
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1. Introduction 
Over the coming decades the populations of many countries, particularly the 
OECD countries, will experience aging. This demographic shock will be caused mainly 
by the post-war "baby boom" generation heading for retirement, although the lower 
fertility and the greater longevity are also contributing factors. For Canada, the so-
called old-age dependency ratio, normally defined as the ratio of the number of elderly 
(aged 65 and over) to the population of working age (15-64), is expected to nearly 
double (from about 0.2 now) by 2035, and then remain at about that level (see Hviding 
and Mérette, 1998, p.7; Denton and Spencer, 2000, p.4). Among the economic 
implications of aging populations, the issue which is perhaps ultimately of most 
concern to policy makers is the effect which such aging may have on per capita living 
standards. The empirical magnitude of this effect is the object of much debate. For a 
single economy such as Canada, this question has been examined using two general 
approaches: closed and open-economy specifications. In the former case, real wages 
and real interest rates are sensitive to domestic demographic conditions. However, 
applying the closed-economy model can only be justified if the analysis refers at least 
to the entire North American economy. For the analysis to be exclusive to Canada, we 
have to consider a small open-economy model. In this case, the assumption of perfect 
capital mobility pegs the interest rate. When combined with a standard constant-
returns-to-scale production technology, perfect capital mobility also pegs the wage rate. 
Thus, in a small open-economy model, factor prices are not affected by domestic 
demographic conditions. 
Furthermore, examining the macroeconomic consequences of aging populations 
for a single economy – using a small open-economy framework – might also be 
problematic, because assuming that the rate of interest is constant implies implicitly 
that no similar changes take place abroad. However, in the real world, population aging 
appears to be a world-wide phenomenon – although not perfectly synchronized. With a 
general aging process one would instead expect a fall in the world interest rates. 
Therefore one objective of this present paper, is to use an overlapping generations small 
open-economy model – calibrated to Canada – to highlight the concern that by ignoring 
the influence of population aging on the rate of interest, we may systematically   3
misestimate the effect which aging may have on a country’s living standards and its net 
foreign asset position. As a consequence, the scope of policy responses – those 
designed to ameliorate or offset these effects – may be very inaccurate.  
Moreover, following Mankiw's (2000) advice that all applied public finance 
analyses involving household saving must allow for the fact that a significant number 
of households live "hand-to-mouth" (and so do not save), we evaluate how aging 
populations may affect people differently depending on whether or not they save for the 
future. 
Another aspect of the aging is its implications for public pension funding. The 
aging population may undermine the sustainability of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social 
insurance arrangements like the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP). However, the 
financial viability of the PAYG system can be maintained – despite an aging population 
– if payroll taxes are increased (as is the ongoing plan in Canada). But some of these 
increases in payroll taxes will raise the natural unemployment rate, with the result that 
the transfers to retirees will be at least partly funded by reducing economic outcomes 
for younger individuals at the lower end of the income scale. This outcome is often 
overlooked. Thus, another purpose of this paper is to estimate the magnitude of this 
effect. We also examine whether it is better to have the contributions of workers or 
firms adjust to finance pension benefits as the elderly dependency ratio increases. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly 
describes our methodology. Section 3 reviews the literature to motivate our modeling 
approach. In Section 4 we fully describe our model and in Section 5 we discuss its 
theoretical results regarding the effects of payroll taxes on unemployment, and compare 
them to those derived in some other studies. Section 6 explains how we derived 
analytical expressions used in the computer simulation experiments to examine the 
broader consequences of an aging population. Section 7 presents and discusses the 
baseline calibration of the model. In Section 8 we report and analyze illustrative 
quantitative results (with sensitivity tests) from the computer simulations. Section 9 
concludes the paper. 
 
   4
2. Research Methodology 
The core of the analysis is a model of a small open economy that involves 
overlapping generations and life-cycle features. It builds on Blanchard's (1985) and 
Nielsen's (1994) extensions of the representative-agent model of household behavior. 
In this paper, the overlapping generations model is extended in two important 
ways. First, following Mankiw's (2000) suggestion, there is a subset of households that 
are liquidity constrained and cannot afford to save. Second, a model of asymmetric 
information in the labor market (Summers, 1988) is added, so that involuntary 
unemployment emerges for a subset of the liquidity constrained households. This 
model of efficiency wages (which is well-suited for numerical calibration) is inserted 
within the overlapping generations structure without exposing the analysis to Ambler's 
(1994) criticism of earlier work (e.g. Phelps, 1994) that shared these objectives. As in 
Nielsen, there is a PAYG public pension system. The forward-looking households who 
plan for the future have both private savings and the public pension available during 
their retirement years; the liquidity-constrained ones have only the public pension and 
transfer payments in old age. Some in the latter group rely on income transfers before 
retirement as well – since there is an employment insurance system. In the model, as in 
Canada, both the public pension and employment insurance programs are financed by 
earmarked proportional wage taxes levied on firms and their employees. 
In the literature, pension systems and unemployment have traditionally been 
studied in separate classes of models. Pension systems are typically analyzed in 
intertemporal models that focus on savings incentives provided by the various systems. 
The usual assumption is that the labor market is perfectly competitive, so that there is 
no unemployment. Models of equilibrium unemployment usually neglect the role of 
pension systems. In a recent paper, Corneo and Marquardt (2000) provide a step toward 
a more integrated analysis of the PAYG public pension and employment insurance 
programs. They develop a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous 
growth that highlights the interaction between the two social security systems (SSS) in 
the presence of a labor market with union wage-setting. Although they do not examine 
the aging issues, they illustrate that valuable insights can be gained – particularly in 
terms of growth policy – by studying branches of the social security system in a unitary   5
framework. For example, the contribution rates to the SSS are shown to exert growth 
effects, which would not arise if only one of these programs were present. As a result, 
some economic implications that arise from the externalities between programs may be 
overlooked if one program is analyzed in isolation. In line with these authors, this paper 
provides a more integrated approach and analyzes the spillover effects between the 
public pension system and unemployment within the same macro model in the context 
of an aging population. Moreover, the behavior of other important macro variables, 
such as consumption and foreign debt accumulation, are addressed. 
 
3. Literature Review 
In general there is no simple aggregate consumption function in an economy 
composed of finitely lived agents. This is because agents differ in two respects. Being 
of different ages, they have different levels and compositions of wealth. Having 
different horizons, they have different propensities to consume out of wealth. This 
problem makes exact or approximate aggregation impossible (Modigliani, 1966).  
The solution adopted by Diamond (1965) was to choose a very simple 
population age structure, avoiding altogether the need for aggregation. The solution 
chosen by Blanchard (1985) is, instead, to make assumptions that allow aggregation. 
The central assumption is that agents face, throughout their life, a constant 
instantaneous probability of death p. Thus their expected life is (1/p). Agents are of 
different ages and have different levels of wealth, but they have the same planning 
horizon and the same propensity to consume. This allows one to solve the aggregation 
problem. 
The main advantage of this approach is its flexibility. If we think of (1/p) as the 
horizon index, we can choose it anywhere between zero and infinity. In particular, by 
letting p go to zero, agents have infinite horizons (Ramsey, 1928; Barro, 1974). The 
aggregate consumption function in this overlapping generations model with no bequests 
has a particularly simple and tractable form: it is proportional to the sum of aggregate 
human and nonhuman wealth. The marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth 
is (p+δ), where δ is the rate of time preference. Introducing the government budget 
constraint, Blanchard demonstrates that government debt is a net contributor to wealth   6
because future taxes are discounted by the probability of death plus the interest rate, 
implying that the present value of future primary balances is less than the stock of debt. 
While this approach captures the finite horizon aspect of life, its main drawback 
is that ignores the change in behavior over life, the "life-cycle" aspect. In that respect, 
Nielsen (1994) extended Blanchard's model by allowing retirement. He investigates the 
consequences of changes in a small open economy's unfunded social security system 
(PAYG public pension system) for its net foreign asset position. Assuming that the 
social security system is self-financing (in the sense that at any time t the taxes 
collected from the young correspond to the benefits paid to the old), Nielsen shows how 
an increase in the social security system's benefit rate is likely to lead to higher foreign 
indebtedness, even when "induced" retirement is allowed for. Feldstein (1974) 
identified two effects on private saving from the introduction of a social security 
(PAYG pension) system. On one hand, the value of promised social security benefits 
would reduce people's need to save: social security wealth would replace private 
wealth. On the other hand, expected social security benefits might alter the timing of 
retirement: individuals might retire earlier and accordingly wish to save more during 
their years of employment to prepare for a longer period of retirement. The question 
was whether the former "replacement" effect would dominate the latter "induced 
retirement" effect. If it did, social security would lead to a reduction in private savings 
and thereby national wealth. 
In Blanchard's model, there is no population growth. Weil (1989) considers a 
variant of Blanchard's model where new households continuously enter the economy 
over time but existing households do not leave. He illustrates that the arrival of new 
households is sufficient to generate most of the main results of the Diamond and 
Blanchard models. Buiter (1988) demonstrates that the combination of a nonzero birth 
rate and the absence of operative intergenerational bequest motives yields debt 
nonneutrality in the Blanchard-Weil framework. 
James (1994) seeks to determine the real effects of government deficits and debt 
in Canada. To perform the analysis, he simulates a dynamic, computable, general 
equilibrium model of an open economy, calibrated to Canadian data. His model uses 
the Blanchard-Weil-Buiter overlapping generations framework. The key result is that   7
debt reduction, by increasing total saving today and by allowing future distorting taxes 
to be reduced, leads to increased output and consumption in the future. If, however, the 
initial debt reduction is achieved by raising highly distorting taxes, then the short-term 
costs thus induced exceed the long-term benefits. 
Burbidge and Scarth (1995) use Blanchard's (1985) formulation of the 
overlapping generations model and the social welfare function advocated by Calvo and 
Obstfeld (1988) to analyze interest taxation and tariffs in a small open economy. They 
find that when the revenue lost from the elimination of these taxes is replaced by 
raising the tax on labor, as in the Canadian experience, a "low" social discount rate is 
required for the model to support lower interest-income taxes, while a "high" discount 
rate is needed to support the elimination of tariffs. 
Furthermore, since consumption smoothing is far from perfect, many people 
have net worth near zero, and bequests are an important factor in wealth accumulation, 
Mankiw (2000) suggests an alternative model for analyzing fiscal policy. According to 
Mankiw, a better model to analyze the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy should 
acknowledge the great heterogeneity in consumer behavior that is apparent in the data. 
It should include both low-wealth households who fail to smooth consumption over 
time and high-wealth households who smooth consumption not only from year to year, 
but also from generation to generation. That is, there is a need for a model in which 
some consumers plan ahead for themselves and their descendants, while others are 
liquidity constrained and live paycheck-to-paycheck. All these features are shared by 
our model, except one: there is no bequest motive for the forward-looking households. 
There is a very good case against this assumption since the seminal work of Kotlikoff 
and Summers (1981). However, as noted by Rios-Rull (2001, p.2), two reasons can 
explain this assumption. First, assuming that all assets are held for life cycle motives is 
in part to be in line with the literature of population aging that has always used 
overlapping generations models with little role for bequests. Second, we do not have 
yet models that integrate a suitable theory of wealth inequality and a sophisticated 
demographic structure. In fact, this assumption simplifies the analysis (actually it 
makes it feasible). See Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) and Castaneda et al. (2000) for 
further arguments of what is a good theory of the wealth distribution.   8
In earlier work James (1994) considered an extension similar to that of Mankiw 
(2000) – with one group of households holding all the capital and receiving no labor 
income, the other holding all the government debt and earning all the labor income, and 
with neither being liquidity constrained. 
Finally, although our model is much smaller, it has many broad characteristics 
in common with the Canadian Policy Analysis Model (CPAM) and the OECD’s world 
model (Minilink). 
CPAM is designed to provide a reasonably complete representation of the 
Canadian macroeconomy.
1 It represents a small open economy that produces a single 
domestic good. There are four groups of domestic agents in the model: firms, 
consumers, and the fiscal and monetary authorities. Profit-maximizing firms combine 
labor and capital in a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce the single good. Trend 
population growth and trend productivity growth are exogenous. Consumers come in 
two types. There are forward-looking consumers who make decisions with a view to 
picking the best path for current and future consumption, and "rule-of-thumb" 
consumers who spend all their income in each period. Thus, all assets are held by the 
forward-looking agents. The behavior of the forward-looking consumers is 
characterized using the Blanchard (1985)-Weil (1989) model of overlapping 
generations, but in a discrete-time format. CPAM differs from our model in that our 
model has no monetary authority, no population growth, and our extension of 
Blanchard's model is in continuous time. 
As for Minilink, it is a multi-region dynamic general equilibrium 
macroeconomic model of the world economy designed to examine policy issues over a 
time horizon of many decades.
2 It comprises five regional blocs – the United States, 
Japan, the European Union and the rest of the world, divided into fast and slow-aging 
regions – linked through international financial and goods market relationships. Each 
regional model involves three types of agents – households, firms and government. 
Some consumers are liquidity constrained and the behavior of the forward-looking  
                                                 
1 For more details about CPAM see Black and Rose (1997). 
2 See the technical annex in Turner et al. (1998) for a complete and detailed description of Minilink and 
its properties.   9
consumers is based on an extended version of the Blanchard (1985) model – one in 
which labor income varies with age and the probability of death is a function of the old-
age dependency ratio. The production technology used by the firms is a two-factor 
(capital and labor) constant-returns Cobb-Douglas function with exogenous labor-
augmenting technical progress. Factors of production are assumed to be fully utilized. 
Each region is assumed to produce a single good, which is an imperfect substitute for 
the goods produced by other regions. Finally, the population growth rate is exogenous 
and the model operates in discrete time. 
The OECD’s economics department has used Minilink to analyze the 
macroeconomic implications of aging in global context. A "business-as-usual" case is 
examined in which, without improvements in labor market performance or specific 
policy adjustments to allow for the pressures of aging, economic growth is projected to 
slow significantly over the next 50 years in nearly all OECD countries; world real 
interest rates remain stable at current levels or even rise, because of the negative impact 
of aging on private savings, initially concentrated in the OECD where population aging 
occurs most rapidly. In the absence of specific policy adjustments, aging populations 
will also tend to reduce the growth of living standards (living standards measured as the 
level of output per capita) in the OECD as the output from any given number of 
workers is divided by a greater total population. Thus by 2050, the direct cumulative 
effects of the rise in dependency ratios is to reduce per capita living standards by about 
10, 18 and 23 percent for the United States, the European Union and Japan, 
respectively, relative to a situation where (other things being equal) dependency ratios 
remain at current levels. Further analysis using model simulations, illustrate that only a 
combination of policies (such as measures which promote improvement in total factor 
productivity and increase public saving), carried out on a timely and coordinated 
international basis is likely to be successful in avoiding the slowdown in living 
standards that will be caused by aging.
3 
                                                 
3 Nonetheless, Lee (2001) and Lee and Edwards (2001) examine the fiscal impact of population aging in a 
probabilistic setting. They find that even in the experimental projections in which the rate of productivity 
growth is fixed at a higher level, the fiscal problems arising from aging are highly unlikely to go away. 
Moreover, they indicate that the fiscal consequences of population aging will indeed be severe for the US, 
but in many other industrial nations they will be simply staggering.   10
However, empirical evidence on the impact of population aging on private 
savings is very mixed. Meredith (1995), reviewing the empirical literature, shows that 
estimates of the sensitivity of the savings ratio to the dependency ratio vary 
considerably depending on whether they are based on microeconomic or 
macroeconomic, time series or cross-section data. For example, on the basis of pooled 
time-series estimation across the major industrial countries, Masson and Tryon (1990) 
obtain an estimate suggesting that an increase of 1 percentage point in the dependency 
ratio causes a corresponding fall of 1 percentage point in the savings ratio. At the other 
extreme, household survey evidence typically suggests only a weak (or even positive) 
effect of the dependency ratio on private savings rates (see for example Auerbach et al., 
1991, Canari, 1994, and Borsch-Supan, 1996). A recent empirical study using pooled 
time-series evidence for 21 industrial countries by Masson et al. (1995) provides further 
empirical support for a weak effect of dependency ratios on private savings rates 
(according to which a 1 percentage point rise in the dependency ratio reduces the 
private savings rate by 0.14 percent). 
In the version of the Minilink model used to generate the long-term reference 
scenario, it is assumed that a 1 percentage point rise in the dependency ratio reduces the 
private savings rate by 0.3 percent. This effect operates through a “probability of death” 
parameter which has a direct effect on the propensity to consume out of wealth.
4 In this 
case, world real interest rates rise by up to 0.7 of a percentage point by 2035. However, 
in an alternative simulation where there is no demographic effect on private savings 
behavior, world interest rates fall by 1.5 percentage points by 2035.
5 This effect stems 
from the world-wide slowdown in output growth, caused by a decline in the labor force, 
which reduces the marginal productivity of capital and so reduces interest rates. At the 
slower growth rate, less investment is needed to maintain the required capital stock. 
Thus, from the perspective of the world economy, there is likely to be an ex ante 
reduction in both investment and savings, and the uncertainties follow from which is 
likely to fall by more. 
                                                 
4 Note that in Minilink, the death probability is endogenised as a function of the old-age dependency 
ratio. 
5 See Figure 7 in Turner et al. (1998, p. 69).   11
One of the main contributions in this paper is to insert appropriately a model of 
asymmetric information in the labor market within the overlapping generations 
framework, so that involuntary unemployment emerges. Phelps’ (1994) earlier attempt 
has been criticized by Ambler (1994). As mentioned, the assumption of a constant 
probability of death facilitates the aggregation of individuals' demands. Since there is 
labor market rationing in Phelps' model, Ambler stresses that individual's demand and 
asset accumulation equations depend both on previously accumulated wealth and on 
employment status. This introduces an additional degree of heterogeneity compared to 
the original Blanchard model, and the associated aggregation problem is ignored by 
Phelps. 
Involuntary unemployment appears to be a persistent feature of many modern 
labor markets (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, 1985). The presence of such unemployment 
raises the question of why wages do not fall to clear labor markets. One explanation is 
that, in an asymmetric information and moral hazard situation, firms may not lower 
their wages, even in the face of unemployment, if net productivity depends on wages. 
Profits may fall when wages are reduced, if reducing wages influences productivity by 
affecting workers' effort. As a result, wage rigidities and involuntary unemployment 
arise.
6  
Theories in which there is a cost as well as a benefit to the firm of paying lower 
wages are known as efficiency-wage theories. (The name comes from the idea that 
higher wages may raise the productivity, or efficiency, of labor.) The central idea is that 
if firms cannot monitor their workers' effort perfectly, they may pay more than market-
clearing wages to induce workers not to shirk. If it pays one firm to raise its wage, it 
will pay all firms to raise their wages. When they all raise their wages, the demand for 
labor decreases, and unemployment results. 
However, different kinds of models come under the heading of "efficiency-wage 
theory". Three of the most important are: moral hazard or shirking, adverse selection, 
and sociological models (summaries of efficiency wage models appear in Johnson and 
Layard, 1986; Weiss, 1991; and Phelps, 1994). Here, we focus on shirking models. 
                                                 
6 By involuntary unemployment we mean a situation where an unemployed worker is willing to work for 
less than the wage received by an equally skilled employed worker, yet no job offers are forthcoming.   12
Nonetheless, the ideas behind the latter two are the following: paying a higher wage can 
improve workers' ability along dimensions the firm cannot observe. Specifically, if 
higher-ability workers have higher reservation wages, offering a higher wage raises the 
average quality of the applicant pool, and thus raises the average ability of the workers 
the firm hires. In the last case, a high wage can build loyalty among workers, and hence 
induce high effort; conversely, a low wage can cause anger and desire for revenge, and 
thereby lead to shirking or sabotage. Thus, all efficiency wage models have one 
common feature, namely that the wage enters the production function in a labor-
augmenting way. 
The efficiency-wage theory of structural unemployment, of which Summers' 
(1988) model is an example, combines the rigor demanded by classical economists 
(given its grounding in formal optimization) with a well-defined source of market 
failure (which is at the core of Keynesian economics). As a result, many influential 
economists regard it as the most promising framework for understanding 
unemployment. (See, for example, Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, p.463). 
The final prerequisite for model selection is that it can be readily calibrated, so 
that illustrative and empirically relevant quantitative results can be derived. We have 
chosen Summers' (1988) model of efficiency wages for this reason.
7 Romer (1996) has 
drawn attention to this model as a particularly compact version of efficiency wage 
theory, and we have extended it to allow for various taxes and transfer payments, a 
variable capital stock, and two types of labor, high and low-skilled workers or high and 
low-paid workers. It is worth mentioning that both the Summers model and our 
extension of it have a property which is consistent with economic history. It relates to 
the vast increase in productivity over the past century, associated with no long-term 
trend in the unemployment rate. In our model, productivity has no effect on the 
unemployment rate; some other formulations (for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) 
do not involve this appealing property. 
Finally, regarding the integrated approach, our model on the whole is very close 
in spirit to a recent paper by Corneo and Marquardt (2000). They develop a two-period 
                                                 
7 Pissarides (1998) notes that Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) model has a serious limitation for numerical 
simulations, since it cannot be readily calibrated.   13
overlapping generations model with endogenous growth that highlights the interaction 
between PAYG public pension and employment insurance programs in the presence of 
a labor market with union wage-setting. Although they do not examine the aging issues, 
they illustrate that valuable insights can be gained – particularly in terms of growth 
policy – by studying branches of the social security system in a unitary framework. As a 
result, some economic implications that arise from the externalities between programs 
may be overlooked if one program is analyzed in isolation. 
However, in the two-period overlapping generations model, the length of a 
"period" is one generation – often taken to be 30 years (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995, p.131). One drawback of this framework – as noted by Barro and Sala-i-Martin – 
is that it involves the assumption that there is a 30-year lag between the act of 
abstaining from consumption and the actual use of the newly produced output as capital. 
Therefore, we opt to extend the Blanchard (1985)-Nielsen (1994) specification of 
overlapping generations. Moreover, while the presence of unions in the labor market is 
an important institutional feature of European labor markets, the rate of unionization is 
very small in North America. In Canada, the rate is about 30 percent and mostly 
concentrated in the public sector. As a result, we instead assume a model of asymmetric 
information in the labor market where firms set wages. This model of efficiency wages 
as well as the union model generates involuntary unemployment. 
 
4. The Model 
The core of the analysis is a model of a small open economy that involves 
overlapping generations and life-cycle features. There are three groups of domestic 
agents: firms, consumers, and the government. Profit-maximizing firms combine labor 
and capital in a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce a single good. Trend productivity 
growth is exogenous and there is no population growth. At any time, the economy 
comprises two age groups: the working age people (workers and unemployed) and the 
old (pensioners). Consumers come in two types. There are forward-looking consumers 
(high-paid workers) who make decisions with a view to picking the best path for current 
and future consumption, and "rule-of-thumb" consumers (low-paid workers) who spend 
all their income in each period. Thus, all assets are held by the forward-looking agents.   14
These two types of consumers are in the same proportion in both working age people 
and pensioners, π  and ( 1− ) π . The behavior of the forward-looking consumers is 
characterized using the Blanchard (1985)-Nielsen (1994) model of disjoint overlapping 
generations with retirement. In the model, as in Canada, both the PAYG pension and 
employment insurance programs are financed by earmarked proportional wage taxes 
levied on firms and their employees. 
We now give the details of each of the "building blocks" of the model. 
 
4.1 Firms 
There is a large number of identical competitive firms. The production function 
for the representative firm is of the form:  
YK Q N Q N hl =
−− αβ µ () ( )
1 α β        ( 1 )  
where   and   denote, respectively, the employment of high and low-paid workers, 
 is the capital stock, 
Nh Nl
K Q the labor-augmenting technical progress that grows 
exogenously at rate  , and  n µ  is an index of effort per low-paid worker. Notice that 
there is no work effort index for high-wage workers because we make the assumption 
that these workers do not shirk, since they have "good" jobs which they enjoy. 
Assuming that firms cannot perfectly monitor the effort supplied by low-paid workers, 
they may pay them more than market-clearing wages to induce these workers not to 
shirk. As a result, only the low-wage workers can be unemployed in the economy. 
Though this assumption may be a little restrictive, in practice this group of workers 
represents the largest proportion of the unemployed (see Layard et al, 1991, p.22; 
OECD, 1994, p.243). In addition, as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984, p.443) state in their 
conclusion, involuntary unemployment is a significant factor in the observed level of 
unemployment, especially in low-paid, lower-skilled, blue-collar occupations. 
  Compared to the Cobb-Douglas production technology with only one type of 
labor input, an appealing feature of having two types of labor is that the assumption of 
perfect capital mobility – in the small open economy model – does not peg the wage 
rates.   15
Define  ,   and  yY Q = / kK Q = / wW Q = / , where W is the wage level. The 
problem facing the representative firm is to maximize its profits, which are given by 
Max
kN N w hll ,,,      + l P r ( ) ( ) () () =− + − + + − +
−− kN N r k w N w N hl h f f h l f f
αβ α β µ φ τθ τθ
1 11  
subject to 
µτ θ ε =− − − − {( ) } wt x lw w w 1,     ( 2 )
 8 
where   and   denote, respectively, the wage paid to high and low-skilled workers 
(without including the effect of exogenous ongoing productivity growth on wages); 
wh wl
τ f  
and  θ f  (τ w  and θw ) are the firm's (employees') contribution rates to the pension and 
employment insurance programs, respectively; r  is the interest rate (which is assumed 
to be fixed by perfect capital mobility internationally); φ  the capital depreciation rate; 
 the personal tax rate applied to labor income; and  tw x represents the alternative option 
available to low-wage workers, which is considered as given to the firm. Since ε  is a 
positive fraction, equation (2) shows that a higher wage in the current job raises the 
low-paid worker’s return relative to her alternative and thereby induces higher 
productivity. That gives rise to the interpretation of ε  as the propensity to shirk. 
  Unlike financial and physical capital, both kinds of labor are assumed to be 
completely immobile across borders. 
Setting the derivatives of profits with respect to   and  kN N hl ,,    , wl
9 to zero, we 
have the following first-order conditions:  
  k :  α
y
k
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     (5) 
 
8 Although Summers (1988) and Romer (1996) did not provide micro foundations for this work effort 
function, Scarth and Moutos (2000) showed that it derives support from household optimization behavior. 
9 If there are unemployed workers, the firm can choose the wage freely. If unemployment is zero, on the 
other hand, the firm must pay at least the wage paid by other firms.    16
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Without the asymmetric information that leads to shirking (that is, with ε = 0), 
firms simply set the wage such that the after-tax wage is equal to the workers' outside 
option. With shirking, however, the wage is higher, and with all firms behaving in this 
fashion, employment is lower when the threat of shirking exists. The resulting 
unemployment is involuntary since firms do not accept offers from the unemployed to 
work for less than the profit-maximizing wage. 
The low-paid workers' alternative is a weighted average of the after-tax wage 
received at the other firms and what is received if the individual cannot find work 
(which Summers assumes is a fraction f times w). The weights in the average are the 
employment rate, (1-u), and the unemployment rate, u, respectively. Hence, the 
alternative income is  , where   is the pre-tax wage 
offered at other firms.
xu w t u l
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10 When this definition is substituted into the wage-setting rule 















       ( 8 )  
Thus, unemployment rises with the propensity to shirk (ε ), the personal tax rate applied 
to labor income ( ), employees’ contribution rates to the social security systems ( tw τw  
and θw ), and with the generosity of employment insurance (f). Again, note that a rise in 
labor productivity has no effect on unemployment; instead, it simply raises real wages. 
This property of the model is consistent with economic history. There was a vast 
                                                 
10 Notice that employment insurance benefit,   – which is paid to those unemployed among low-
income individuals – is tax free. Two arguments could be mentioned to justify this assumption. First, 
there exists a basic exemption for personal income tax. And second, only the employed individuals 
contribute to the public pension and employment insurance programs.  
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increase in productivity in the course of the twentieth century, with a corresponding 
increase in wages, but with no long-term trend in the unemployment rate. As noted 
earlier, many formulations of the efficiency-wage hypothesis do not have this appealing 
property. 
 
4.2 The public pension system 
The population of the economy is set equal to unity (at any time t). As in 
Blanchard's model, every individual has, regardless of the time of her birth, the same 
instantaneous probability of death, p, and the birth rate at any time is also equal to p. 
Thus, a cohort born at time zero has a size, as of time t, of  . Since the population 
is split into those of working age and pensioners, the social security (pension ) scheme 
determines – by way of a pension age, 
pe
pt −
λ – the relative size of these two groups. Given 
the death (birth) rate   and the pension age  p λ , the former and latter groups constitute 
the shares ()  and e  of the population, respectively. 1−
− e
pλ p − λ 11 Because the pension 
system is constrained to be self-financing in the sense that all pension benefits in any 
given time are financed by the total amount of contributions paid in that time by the 
firms and their employees, we must have 
        ( 9 )   () ( ) ττ
λ
fwh h l l
p Nw Nw e m ++ =
−
where m is the pension benefit adjusted for the productivity growth. 
Furthermore, since high-paid workers (forward-looking consumers) and low-
paid workers (liquidity-constrained consumers) are in the same proportion in both 
working age people and pensioners, π  and () 1− π , and since only the low-paid 
workers can be unemployed, we have 
          ( 1 0 )   Ne h
p =−
− π
λ ( 1 )
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Inserting equations (10) and (11) into the pension plan budget constraint (equation (9)) 
yields  
() [ ( ) ( ) ] ττ π π
λ




















 is the old-age dependency ratio – the ratio of retirees to those of 
working age. 
Given that equation (12) is balanced in different demographic environments, it is 
important for the analysis that follows to know which variable – whether τw ,  τ f  (or 
both) or   – is set residually to adjust in response to unforeseen demographic changes 
(here, an increase in the elderly dependency ratio). This suggests a potential trade-off 
between efficiency and equity in the adjustment of the pension system to demographic 
shocks. On one hand, by holding the benefit payment fixed a higher dependency ratio 
would constitute a squeeze on the pension budget and the required rise in contribution 
rates could well have distortionary effects in e.g. the labor market. One the other hand, 
by targeting the contribution rates – and letting pension benefits fall endogenously – the 
associated intergenerational redistribution of income against pensioners would hardly 
be acceptable from a viewpoint of social equity. Since in the Canadian experience the 
contribution rates have been increased and since we are interested in estimating the 
magnitude of the distortionary effects on unemployment, we will fix (or target) the 
benefit payment at its previous steady state level and let the contribution rates adjust 
endogenously.  
m
Note also that the projected increase in the old-age dependency ratio can be 
simulated by lowering either the retirement age, λ , or the probability of death,  p 
(which is the birth rate as well; and 1/ p is the life expectancy). In this paper, we will 
proceed by lowering the retirement age. While the share of elderly people will continue 
to increase with both lower fertility and greater longevity, demographers predict that the 
increase in the next three decades will be caused mainly by the baby-boom generation 
heading for retirement, and the only way that can be simulated in the current framework 
is through an assumed reduction in λ . 
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4.3 Consumers 
4.3.1 Forward-looking consumers 
In this subsection, we derive the aggregate consumption function for the 
forward-looking consumers. These individuals do not face any liquidity constraints. 
Their behavior is characterized using the Blanchard/Nielsen framework of overlapping 
generations with retirement. Since Blanchard’s generalization of the representative 
agent formulation is familiar, we focus more on Nielsen’s extension of this 
specification. The main drawback of Blanchard’s approach is that while it captures the 
finite horizon aspect of life it ignores change in behavior over life, the "life-cycle" 
aspect. In that respect, Nielsen extended Blanchard's model by allowing for retirement. 
Here, we extend Nielsen's model by introducing exogenous productivity growth and 
various taxes and transfer payments, and apply it only to the subset of households that 
are forward looking. 
To simplify the exposition, we ignore for the moment the tax on interest income 
and the fact that only a portion of the population has a rate of time preference low 
enough to cause them to operate with a forward-looking plan. As in Blanchard (1985), 
each decision maker has an instantaneous utility function equal to the log of 
consumption, and she discounts the future at rate ( p ) + δ , where δ  and  p are the rate 
of time preference and (constant) probability of death, respectively. 
It is well-known under Blanchard's formulation (1985, p. 229, equation (5)) that 
aggregate consumption is a linear function of aggregate human wealth, , and 
financial wealth, Vt,  
Ht ()
()
  Ct p Ht Vt () ( ) [ () () ] =+ + δ  
Taking the time derivative of this equation gives: 
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() ? The accumulation identity for aggregate 
financial wealth, Vt, is standard:  ()
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where M is the pension benefit. Three assets are available to citizens in the economy: 
physical capital stock,  , public debt,  , and net foreign debt,  . In symbols,   Kt () Bt () At ()
Vt Kt Bt At () () () () =+ − 
As for human wealth we have 
Ht p e MiRtid i d s
p e t i i iWiRtid i d s
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This expression consists of three integrals. The first is the discounted pension benefits 
to be received by that part of the population that is already old (pensioners) at time t - 
i.e. those who were born prior to time t − λ . The second integral corresponds to the 
after-tax wages to be received in the future by the young (workers) from time t to their 
retirement at s + λ , after which they will receive pension benefits. The latter benefits 
are captured by the third integral. 
Reversing the order of integration and differentiating by making use of Leibniz's 
formula, we have 
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To achieve a model which is stationary in equilibrium, this identity and the ones that 
follow are expressed in terms of variables that are ratios of each aggregate to labor-  21
augmenting technical progress,  , which grows at rate n. Q
12 Moreover, since tax rates 
are constant – except once-and-for-all changes – we have 
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   (13) 
This equation reduces to Blanchard's specification when λ = ∞ , and it further reduces 
to the standard infinitely lived representative agent analysis if  . Given this 
nesting, the model provides an appealing overlapping generations structure. Note that 
this equation differs from Nielsen's in three respects. First, since we split labor into two 
groups, equation (13) is derived without inserting the self-financing pension plan 
condition (equation (12)), and this explains the third element on the right-hand side of 
the equation (13). Second, tax payments are proportional to wages. And third, we have 
productivity growth. 
p = 0
Next, when we add the tax rate on interest income and use the fact that this 
theory applies only to the proportion π of the population (forward-looking consumers or 
high-paid workers) who hold all assets () kba + −  in the economy, we get 
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where   is the tax rate applied to interest income.  ti
 
4.3.2 Liquidity-constrained consumers 
These individuals live hand-to-mouth and therefore fail to smooth consumption 
over time. One can associate hand-to-mouth behavior with individuals who have high 
discount rates and often face binding borrowing constraints. Thus, the workers, 
unemployed, and pensioners of this group spend all of their incomes (which are after-
 
12 As before, we will use lower case letters to denote variables adjusted for the productivity growth.  
Moreover, if we choose unity as the initial value for y, some lower case letters can be interpreted as the 
ratio of those variables to GDP.   22
tax wages, employment insurance benefits, and pension benefits, respectively, plus their 
transfer payments). By use of equation (11), we have the following aggregate spending 
equation  
      (15) 
cu e w t
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where   is consumption of the low income group,   and   denote, respectively, the 
generosity of employment insurance and transfer payments. On the right-hand side of 
equation (15), the first term represents the after-tax labor income of workers, the second 
term the employment insurance paid to those unemployed, the third element the pension 
payments, and the fourth – transfer payments that go to low income individuals whether 




4.4 Government and foreign debts 
For simplicity we assume that the public debt is owned entirely by domestic 
residents and that the domestic physical capital stock and net foreign assets are perfectly 
substitutable. Then, one might think of foreign debt as the share of the physical capital 
stock employed domestically that is owned by foreigners. Foreign debt, a, increases 
whenever net interest payments on pre-existing foreign debt exceed the country's net 
exports
14, 
     (16)  ar t n ay n k kg cc ih
⋅
=− −− − ++ − − − (( ) ) [ ( ( )
.
)] 1 φ
where g is government direct spending. Since there are no adjustment costs involved 




13 Assuming that transfer payments go only to the “poor” can be justified by the fact that income taxes are 
proportional in our model, whereas they are actually progressive. 
14 Although there is only one good, foreigners can buy domestic output, and domestic residents can buy 
foreign output. Thus, the only function of international trade in this model is to allow domestic 
production to diverge from domestic aggregate demand. In other words, we consider the intertemporal 
aspects of international trade but neglect the implications for patterns of specialization in production.   23
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  As for the evolution of government debt , b, we have 
           ( 1 8 )  
⋅
which states that public debt increases whenever the deficit, d, exceeds the economy’s 
growth rate times the pre-existing debt. The government budget deficit is the excess of 
government spending over tax revenue. Using equations (10) and (11), we have 
t bf w u e t p
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The government spends on direct purchases, net interest payments on the outstanding 
debt, employment insurance benefits, and transfer payments. Revenue is derived from 
taxes on interest income and wages, and form the contributions to the employment 
insurance program made by firms and their employees. 
We have assumed that the government collects tax on all the interest income that 
is generated within the country. In effect, the government levies a withholding tax on 
foreigners that is equal to the tax that is levied on domestic residents. Also, as in 
Canada, we considered employment insurance program surpluses (or deficits) as an 
element of the overall government budget constraint. 
 
5. Theoretical results and comparisons with the existing literature  
Some relevant theoretical results stem from the present model. In contrast to the 
employees', the firms' contribution rates to the pension and employment insurance 
programs are shown to have no influence on the unemployment rate; this follows from: 
 
15 Indeed, if a k z =−
a
, is positive, it corresponds to net claims by foreigners on the domestic economy. 
Conversely, if   is negative, it represents net claims by domestic residents on foreign economies.   24




























Hence, attempts to fight unemployment by means of reductions in the payroll tax on 
firms are useless in this model. Nevertheless, a decrease in tax rates on workers results 
in a lower unemployment rate. To understand the intuition behind these results, consider 
each category in turn. 
Tax rates on firms 
An increase in firms' contribution rates decreases their willingness to pay for 
labor. Workers recognize this fact and so generally reduce their wage claims in line 
with the firms' decreased ability to pay. The fact that all firms have a similarly 
decreased willingness to pay is what leaves workers no option but to accept the wage 
cut. Thus, an increase in the employer payroll tax will reduce the net return to working; 
and since employment insurance benefit is a fixed proportion of the gross wage, it will 
also reduce (proportionately) the net returns from being unemployed. As a result, 
raising employer taxes will not influence the comparative attractions of working and 
being jobless with benefits, so unemployment will be unaffected by firms’ tax rates 
changes. In fact, most empirical studies find that these payroll taxes are, for all intents 
and purposes, fully passed on to employees in the form of lower wages
16, so firms' 
contribution rates are actually a "wage killer", not a "job killer". To put the point 
differently, in our model and in reality, a cut in these payroll taxes does not raise 
employment, it only raises the wages of those who already have jobs. 
Tax rates on employees 
  An increase in taxes levied on employees makes the work less attractive for 
them and therefore raises their propensity to shirk. More specifically, if an employee 
payroll tax rate (or income tax rate) is increased, this will reduce the return to working 
but not reduce the prospective benefit if jobless, since that benefit is computed as a 
fixed proportion of the gross wage and assumed to be tax free. Hence, a hike in the 
                                                 
16 There is an important empirical literature that reports that in the long-run, employer payroll taxes are 
fully shifted to labor in the form of lower wages. See, for example, Dahlby (1992, 1993); Kesselman 
(1997) for a survey.    25
employee tax rates will make work relatively less attractive and induce workers to shirk. 
Firms react by paying higher wages. As a result, the demand for labor decreases, and 
higher unemployment results. Thus, these taxes are a job killer. Clearly, cutting them 
decreases the propensity of employees to shirk. As the wage employers must pay 
decreases, firms hire more workers. 
  Regarding the effects of labor taxation in efficiency wage models, the existing 
literature leads to surprisingly different conclusions. Pisauro (1991) illustrates that the 
features of the effort function, µ , are the source of the difference in the outcomes. In 
particular, three elements turn out to be important: 
 (i)  whether  µ(, . ) w
17 is a continuous and concave function; 
(ii) whether  µ(, depends on the expected alternative income earned 
outside the firm, say x; and 
. ) w
(iii) whether  µ(,  is homogeneous of degree zero in w and  x.  ) wx
The effort function in our model is consistent with (i) and (ii).  
We can now compare our results with what other efficiency wage models 
predict. In the "rudimentary" efficiency wage model proposed for expositive purposes 
by Yellen (1984)
18, µ  is continuous but does not depend on x; that is µ µ = () w . In this  
case, an ad valorem tax on labor (a wage tax) has no effect on the after-tax wage (i.e. 
the tax is borne entirely by firms) and there is a negative effect on employment. On the 
other hand, a specific tax (an employment tax) leads to an increase in the after-tax 
wage.  
In Johnson and Layard (1986), µ  is continuous and homogeneous of degree 
zero in w and x, that is µ µ = (/) wx . In this framework, an ad valorem tax will be 
borne entirely by workers, leading to a reduction in the after-tax wage by the full 
amount of the tax and leaving employment unaffected (the same results as in our model, 
but the prediction is completely reversed when compared to the "rudimentary" model). 
And a specific tax may either lower or raise the after-tax wage but it will definitely 
cause a decrease in employment.  
                                                 
17 The notation indicates that the effort or efficiency function depends on the real wage and other 
variables. 
18 Note that in Yellen's model, and in the subsequent (moral hazard) ones, tax refers to the employers' tax.    26
In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), µ  depends also on x, but is not homogeneous of 
degree zero, and can assume only two values: 0 and  . In this setting, the effect of 
an increase in the two taxes is exactly the same: a decrease in the after-tax wage, but by 
less than the full amount of the tax, and a decrease in employment.  
µ
* > 0
Finally, in Pisauro (1991),  µ  is continuous between 0 and 1, concave, and is a 
positive function of the wage, unemployment rate, and detection rate, and a negative 
function of unemployment benefits and the (constant) marginal disutility of effort. 
(Recall that in our model, x also depends on w, u, f ). In Pisauro's model, ad valorem 
and specific taxes on labor do not have the same impact on the real wage. The 
imposition of a specific tax causes an increase in the net real wage. However, both taxes 
have a negative effect on employment. This difference with respect to what our model 
predicts comes from the fact that in Pisauro's  model, the effort function involves the 
restriction µwu = 0. 
Regarding these various assumptions about the effort function, Pisauro states 
that the alternative income, x, seems an essential ingredient of a moral hazard model 
with some micro foundation. But there are no reasons, apart from simplifying the 
problem (with some costs), to suppose either that there is only one possible positive 
level of effort (as should be obvious on the ground of realism), or that µ(,) wx should 
be homogenous of degree zero in w and x. On a priori grounds, a desirable effort 
function should therefore be continuous and have the general form µ(,) wx. In that 
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6. Population aging effects 
In order to examine the broader effects of an aging population (as represented by 
an increase in the old-age dependency ratio) we have constructed a calibrated version of 
the model presented above. Collecting some equations together the model reduces to the 
following system: 
yk e u w t
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These equations determine  ,  ,  ,  , u,  y k wh wl τ
19,  ,  ,  .  ch cl z
                                                 
19 We have removed the subscript, since following an increase in the elderly dependency ratio the 
government might choose τ w  or τ f  (or both) to balance the pension plan budget constraint. We derive 
quantitative results for all three cases.    28
To get equation (1') we divided (1) by  , then substituted in equations (2) (using the  Q x 
definition), (10) and (11). Equations (4') and (5') result from using equations (10) and 
(11), respectively. The use of the definition, z k a = − , implies (14'). Equation (15') 
follows from inserting (19) (substituting out transfer payments,  ) into (15). Finally, 
note that equation (18) is ignored since the government debt is kept constant in all 
experiments reported below. In fact, the level of government transfer payments adjusts 
residually to keep the budget deficit ratio constant.  
tp
  Next, we take the total differential of the system and eliminate the changes in  y  
and   by substitution. Then, we focus on a set of seven equations that determine 
changes in  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   and 
k
z ch cl wh wl u τ . We denote absolute changes by   and 
percentage changes by  . 
d
∆
Thus, the model can be summarized as follows: 
Ω∆ ∆ Θ Γ [
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20 The elements of these matrices are fully reported in Appendix A.   29
7. Model calibration 
  As a starting point for the analysis, the model is solved for an initial steady-state 
equilibrium in which all key ratios (most stock and variables being expressed as 
proportion of output)
21 are assumed to be constant. This numerical steady state is 
obtained by choosing values for the fundamental parameters of the model and all the 
stock and flow variables, to reflect as far as possible the economic situation in Canada 
in the years 1999-2000. This is achieved by selecting ratios on the basis of values 
observed in data and then using the model's equations to determine the remaining 
variables residually to insure internal consistency. The values for the key ratios and 
parameters are reported in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Variables and parameters  benchmark  perturbation
r      interest rate  0.05  0.046 
n     productivity growth rate  0.02   
φ      capital depreciation rate  0.06  
λ      retirement age  40 34 
p     probability of death  0.02  
π      proportion of population not liquidity constrained  0.6  
δ      rate of time preference, forward-looking consumers  0.0332  
α     capital's share of output  0.33  
β      high-skilled labor’s share of output  0.536  
k      capital-output ratio  3   
a     initial foreign debt ratio  0.3   
b     government debt ratio  0.53   
g      government spending ratio  0.14  
ti      tax rate on interest income  0.2  
tw     tax rate on labor income  0.2  
u     proportion of unemployed among low-paid workers  0.175   
f     unemployment benefits as a proportion of wage  0.4  
θw   employee contribution rate to employment insurance  0.015  
θ f    employer contribution rate to employment insurance  0.021  
τ w   employee contribution rate to the PAYG pension plan  0.085  
τ f    employer contribution rate to the PAYG pension plan  0.085  
 
                                                 
21 As noted above, we have chosen unity as the initial value for y, so that most of the variables in lower 
case letters can be interpreted as relative to GDP.    30
Since we exclude childhood and the period of life when people receive their 
education (people aged 1-20, say), our model does not distinguish between start of life 
and start of working life. Hence the period from age zero to λ  covers the working life 
period which we set to 40. These assumptions imply that people retire on average at 
about age 60. Also, the assumed probability of death, 0.02, implies a life expectancy of 
50 years
22 (or 70 years if we think of life "beginning" at age 20). These values appear to 
be a fair approximation for Canada and most OECD countries. 
  However, as just indicated, given the assumptions regarding the steady-state of 
certain stock variables, the values of many flow variables are automatically determined 
by equilibrium conditions and, hence, some differ significantly from recently-observed 
values. For example, since the government debt and economy’s growth rate are 
positive, one of the government budget identities (equation (18)) implies a budget 
deficit-to-GDP ratio of 1.06 percent in the baseline "steady state".
23 The initial ratios of 
total private consumption, investment and net exports to GDP (0.614, 0.24 and 0.006 
respectively) are implied by the variable and parameter values in Table 1. 
As noted, the selected parameter values must satisfy all steady-state restrictions 
of the model. To accomplish this, some parameters have to be chosen residually, and 
the rate of time preference for forward-looking consumers and capital’s share of output 
were selected in this regard. Since this implied rate of impatience (0.0332) is less than 
the interest rate (0.05), the consumption of these individuals rises as they age. (No 
specific rate of time preference is involved for the hand-to-mouth group; it is assumed 
that these individuals, in addition to earning lower labor income, are sufficiently 
impatient that they never save.) 
  Beach and Slotsve's (1996) examination of data indicates that the lowest two 
quintiles of the earnings distribution in Canada get about 20 percent of earnings. On the 
other hand, Wolff (1998) reports that the lowest two quintiles of the financial wealth  
 
                                                 
22 Recall that, in the model, expected life is given by 1/p. 
23 It is worth noting that such a discrepancy also appears in the OECD's world model, Minilink. Besides, 
in Minilink, since the United States has net foreign liabilities, it is necessary to assume that it is running a 
trade surplus (which is not what we observe) in the baseline steady state to cover interest payments, so 
that net liabilities remain a stable share of GDP.   31
distribution hold only 0.2 percent of household wealth. Based on these facts, we have 
chosen appropriate values for β  and π .  
  The reported values for the employment insurance (EI) contribution and payout 
rates are lower than the actual legislated values. The reason for this discrepancy is that 
the actual program involves no payroll taxes beyond certain income levels, a qualifying 
period involving no EI benefits, and a maximum number of weeks of benefits. Since we 
have followed Summers and modeled an EI system without such limits, we have had to 
reduce the replacement ratio and the payroll tax rates accordingly (as OECD analysts do 
when making international comparisons; see Martin, 1996). Nonetheless, the ratio of the 
employer and the employee contribution rates reflects the 1.4 factor in the Canadian 
system.
24 
  Next, we justify the calibrated values for the employee and employer pension 
contribution rates (the last two parameters in Table 1) which are higher than the actual 
values. The reason for this discrepancy is that in the model, the old-age dependency 










 (the ratio of the share of retirees to the share of 
working-age people in the population), where  p and λ  are the death probability and 
retirement age, respectively. Hence, it is obvious that we cannot choose independent 
values for  p,  λ  and  ; one parameter has to be determined by the equation. As a 
consequence, although our selected values for the probability of death and retirement 
age are individually reasonable, together they imply a dependency ratio that 
corresponds more closely to the “overall” dependency ratio
DR
25 than to the elderly 
dependency ratio in Canada. With this implied (higher) dependency ratio, the actual 
contribution rates to the public pensions (CPP/QPP) lead to a relatively small individual 
pension payment (as a proportion of the average wage) of 9 percent. Therefore, in the 
baseline steady state, we have raised the contribution rates such that the pension 
payment as a proportion of the average wage is about 21 percent – which is a sensible 
number.  
                                                 
24 Since 1971 the employer contribution rate for EI is 1.4 times the rate paid by employees. Pre-1971, 
employers and employees paid matching contributions which varied with earnings. 
25 The overall dependency ratio refers to the ratio of the population who are not of working age (both 
young and old) to those who are.   32
  Finally, the third column in Table 1 shows our "estimate" of the shock to the 
retirement age that leads to the projected increase in the dependency ratio as the baby-
boom generation retires, and the change in the world real interest rates that might be 
expected to accompany this demographic event. Over the next 35 years, the ratio of the 
Canadian labor force to the Canadian population is expected to fall from 0.525 to 0.475 
– a 10 percent reduction.
26 The main reason for this development is that the baby-boom 
generation is growing older (see Mankiw and Scarth (2001, p.104)). The perturbation to 
the retirement age in Table 1 is consistent with this fact.
27 Furthermore, according to the 
estimates reported by the OECD's economics department, world-wide population aging 
would lead to changes in world real interest rates that vary between (-1.5 to + 0.7) 
percentage points by 2035, depending on the assumed effect of population aging on 
private savings (see Figure 7 in Turner et al. (1998, p. 69)).
28 We have chosen a number 
that lies in the middle of this range – a drop of 40 basis points. 
  Furthermore, although we focus on the small open economy, the model could be 
solved in steady state as a closed economy to generate an endogenous interest rate 
change following an increase in the dependency ratio. Obviously, this procedure may be 
appealing if we assume that the calibration to the Canadian economy is representative 
of the entire Western world, and that the aging population phenomenon will proceed 
roughly the same way throughout all these countries. Thus, applying this procedure 






                                                 
26 If we normalize the population at 1, these numbers imply that the Canadian overall dependency ratio 
will increase by 22.16 percent in three decades. 
27 Since our baseline calibration generates an overall dependency ratio, we found it consistent to use the 
projection of this ratio in estimating the shock to the retirement age – despite the fact that the projection 
of the old-age dependency ratio may give a more accurate description of the economic burden arising 
from population aging.  
28 The first number follows by assuming that demographic change has no effect on private savings 
behavior; whereas, for the last one, it is assumed that a 1 percentage point rise in the dependency ratio 
reduces the private savings rate by 0.3 percent. However, as mentioned earlier, the empirical evidence on 
the impact of population aging on savings is very mixed.   33
8. Quantitative results 
8.1 Long and short-run effects of increased elderly dependency ratio 
  We consider first the cases in which domestic population aging (or an increase 
in the domestic old-age dependency ratio) is not accompanied by aging in the rest of the 
world, and so does not involve any change in the rate of interest.
29 At the start, we 
assume that both the employee and employer contribution rates adjust (equally) to 
balance the pension plan budget constraint as the dependency ratio increases. Then, 
using Gauss to solve the model yields the following two differential equations 
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  Denote the 2x2 matrix above by Ψ , henceforth. Since c  is a ''jump'' variable, 
while 
h
z is predetermined at each point in time, a unique convergent solution requires 
that there be just one negative eigenvalue for matrix Ψ . Given that the determinant of 
 is the product of  the two eigenvalues, saddlepath stability requires det (Ψ ) < 0; that 
condition is met. 
Ψ
  Following an unexpected but permanent reduction in the retirement age, which 
raises the dependency ratio, the dynamics of evolution in (domestic) forward-looking 
aggregate consumption and financial wealth (composed of ownership of domestic 
capital stock and net financial claims on foreigners) is illustrated in the phase diagram 
in Figure 1.







= 0 locus is positively sloped. Further, since equation system (21) is linear, so is 
the saddlepath, SS, which equation is given by 






                                                 
29 Hereafter, we refer to these cases as the reference scenario cases. 
30 Although the public debt belongs in this group’s financial wealth, it is irrelevant in the dynamic 
analyses, since it is kept constant through time.    34





 are the initial values (after the jump onto the saddlepath in the case of 
consumption),   and z
* are the steady-state values, and ϕ  is the slope of the 
saddlepath. Both this slope and the negative eigenvalue – which defines the system’s 
speed of adjustment once on the saddlepath – can be readily calculated from the matrix 
. (See appendix A for a brief sketch of that procedure.)   Ψ
  In Figure 1, the initial steady state is represented by the point 1. After a once-
and-for-all reduction in the retirement age, consumption drops immediately to a lower 
level corresponding to point 2 on the saddlepath SS, and then the system moves over 
time (along SS) toward point 3 (the new steady state, where consumption is still below 
its initial steady-state level).
31 
  On impact, consumption falls by 12.88 percent of its initial full-equilibrium 
value (see Table 2, Bm.1, Col.1)
32. This effect is calculated according to equation (22), 
and the outcome is simply a weighted average of the steady-state effects. (Note that 
since  z is a predetermined variable,  is zero.) During the transition period, 
consumption increases gradually until the new full equilibrium is reached; at that stage 




What are the mechanisms that lead to these results?  
The initial fall in consumption is the net effect of forces working in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, a lowering of the retirement age means that the labor force 
shrinks. This (other things being equal) reduces the marginal productivity of capital – 
which leads to a downward pressure on the interest rate – and increases the marginal 
product of labor – which pushes pre-tax wages up. On the other, since perfect capital 
mobility pegs the rate of interest (and since we assume initially that the increased 
dependency ratio has no effect on the interest rate), the physical capital stock has to 
decrease. This reduction in the capital stock (that ensures the constant interest rate) 
lowers the marginal product of labor – and that reduces pre-tax wages. In addition, 
firms are now willing to pay less for labor – since their contribution rate to the public 
                                                 
31 Since the share of forward-looking individuals in the population is constant through time, the average 
consumption of this group also displays a similar pattern. 
32 Bm. and Col. denote Benchmark and Column, respectively. 
33 For the same reason as in the footnote 31, these numbers also correspond to the variations in average 
consumption among forward-looking agents.   35
pension system increases with demographic changes. According to our results (see 
Table 3, Bm.1, Col.1), these downward pressures on pre-tax wages dominate. 
Moreover, after-tax wages also decrease – since the employees’ pension contribution 
rate has increased as well. Thus, these negative effects on pre and after-tax wages 
combined with the fact that the number of workers has shrunk explain why the average 
consumption of this group has declined on impact.  
Furthermore, since z is a predetermined variable, z ka = −  implies that on 
impact, the variations in domestic physical capital stock correspond to the variations in 
foreign indebtedness. Therefore, as indicated in Table 3 (Bm.1, Col.1), the physical 
capital stock ratio falls on impact by an amount that is just equal to the initial foreign 
debt ratio. Hence, following the “aging” shock, the remaining physical capital is 
entirely owned by domestic (forward-looking) residents. After these initial adjustments, 
the dynamics of z is determined by that of   – since the change in the physical capital 
stock is once-and-for-all. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, during the transition to the new 
full equilibrium, the forward-looking group’s consumption rises gradually as their 
claims on foreign agents increase. However, in the new steady state their living 
standards remain below the initial full-equilibrium level – despite the resulting higher 
level of non-human wealth.  
a
As for the hand-to-mouth group, the decline in their average consumption is 
greater (18.54 percent of the initial steady-state value – both initially and in new full 
equilibrium) (see Table 2, Bm.1, Col.1). The causes of that large fall are the following. 
First, for the same reasons as before, the labor force has shrunk and also the low-paid 
workers in this group suffer a reduction in their pre- and after-tax wages. However, 
since firms induce these workers not to shirk, the fall in their pre-tax wages is lower 
than that of the high-wage workers (see Table 3, Bm.1, Col.1). As a result, the 
unemployment rate among lower-skilled workers increases by 0.7 of one percentage 
point (see Table 2, Bm.1, Col.1). Second, the government transfer payments – which go 
only to this group of low-income individuals – have decreased. The reduction in pre-tax 
wages, physical capital stock employed within the country, and the lower number of 
workers result in a loss of revenue for the government. Therefore, transfer payments 
have to adjust accordingly to maintain the government budget deficit. Although, the   36
domestic (forward-looking) residents have built up a positive stock of net foreign assets 
(see Table 3, Bm.1, Col.1), that does not have any revenue implications for the 
domestic government – since by assumption it collects tax on the interest income that is 
generated within the country irrespective of who owns that capital.  
The first column of benchmark 2 in Tables 2 and 3 show how the results change 
when  only the employees’ pension contribution rate adjusts residually as the 
dependency ratio rises. Relative to the previous case, there are fewer downward 
pressures on the pre-tax wages – since the firms’ contribution rate is unaffected. 
Besides, the wage paid to lower-skilled workers increases (see Table 3, Bm.2, Col.1). 
The intuition runs as follows. A relatively higher increase in taxes levied on employees 
makes the work less attractive for low-paid workers and therefore raises their propensity 
to shirk. Knowing that, firms react by paying higher wages. As a result, the labor 
demand for these workers decreases more, and a consequent higher unemployment 
emerges. In this case, the rate of unemployment among these workers increases by 1.3 
percentage points (see Table 2, Bm.2, Col.1) – compared to 0.7 percentage point above. 
Finally, the first column of benchmark 3 in Tables 2 and 3 report how the results 
are affected by the assumption that only the firms’ contribution rate varies 
endogenously following an increase in the dependency ratio. In this case, the effort 
supplied by lower-skilled workers (and hence their productivity) is unaffected. This is 
because an increase in the firms’ pension contribution rate – which reduces market 
wage rates – lowers the net return both to working and to drawing employment 
insurance benefits, since raising this tax affects the net returns to work and non-work 
proportionately. Therefore, the low-paid workers’ comparative attractions of working 
and being jobless with benefits are unaffected. Then, since there is no threat of shirking, 
both groups’ pre-tax wages decline by an equivalent amount (see Table 3, Bm.3, Col.1). 
As a result, the unemployment rate is unchanged (see Table 2, Bm.3, Col.1). 
In summary, comparisons of the first column of the three benchmarks in Table 2 
suggest that the choice of which contribution rate becomes the dependent variable (as 
the dependency ratio increases) has little effect on the impact of aging on average living 
standards – this is true whether or not agents are forward-looking. However, the choice 
matters for labor market distortions, and therefore, for the unemployment rate. More   37
specifically, in contrast to the employees’, the firms’ contribution rates to both the 
public pension and employment insurance programs are shown to have no influence on 
the unemployment rate. It also appears that the hand-to-mouth individuals are those 
who take a bigger hit in their average living standards – both in the short run and in the 
long run. Nevertheless, on the whole, we should regard population aging as an 
upcoming threat to living standards, and therefore there is a need for policy actions that 
may ameliorate or reverse the effect of aging on per-capita living standards. 
Furthermore, notice the substantial swings in net foreign asset positions (see the 
last row in Table 3, Col.1 for each benchmark). Although, the magnitude of these 
swings is considerably larger than has been experienced, it is reassuring to note that it is 
similar to ones reported by the OECD’s world model, Minilink (see Figures 6, 9 on 
pages 68 and 71, respectively, in Turner et al. (1998)). 
So far, we have assumed that there are no demographic changes in the rest of the 
world and more explicitly that the rate of interest is constant. However, in the real 
world, the aging population seems to be a world-wide phenomenon – although not 
perfectly synchronized. With a general aging process one would instead expect a fall in 
the world interest rates. Therefore, we now consider the possibility that an increase in 
the elderly dependency ratio will have a negative effect on the world rate of interest – 
which we assume decreases by four tenths of one percentage point. To examine how 
this eventuality modifies the results, we initially revert to the assumption that both the 
employee and employer pension contribution rates adjust (in equal proportion) as the 
dependency ratio increases. Then using Gauss to solve the model yields the following 
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  Following an increase in the dependency ratio – which is accompanied by a 
reduction in the rate of interest, the full dynamic response of (domestic) forward-  38
looking aggregate consumption and financial wealth is shown in Figure 2; and the 
numerical results are reported on the second column of benchmark 1 in Tables 2 and 3. 
  As illustrated in Figure 2, after the “aging” shock (and the accompanying 
interest rate effect), the system moves from its initial full equilibrium, point 1, to point 2 
immediately; then as time passes, the system moves to point 3. The initial fall in 
consumption is less, 8.52 percent – compared to 12.88 percent in the reference scenario 
case (see the two columns of benchmark 1 in Table 2). This result stems from the fact 
that there are fewer downward pressures on both pre- and after-tax wages. First, since 
the rate of interest decreases, the required reduction in the physical capital stock is 
smaller (see Table 3, Bm.1, Col.2). As a result, the negative effect on pre-tax wages of a 
decline in capital stock is mitigated. Second, with the lower reduction in pre-tax wages, 
the rise in the two contribution rates that is needed to balance the pension plan is lower 
– for the same increase in the elderly dependency ratio. This implies a smaller decrease 
in the after-tax wage. Consequently, by ignoring the world-wide aging – and hence a 
reduction in world real interest rates, we overestimate the initial impact of population 
aging on domestic savers’ living standards. 
  Furthermore, during the transition to the new full equilibrium, the forward-
looking group’s living standards decrease gradually as their level of foreign 
indebtedness increases; that is seen in Figure 2. Indeed, the lower interest rate means a 
reduced incentive for private saving and therefore a lower level of non-human wealth. 
At the new steady state, the average consumption of this group is reduced by 10.48 
percent – compared to 6.91 percent in the reference scenario case (see the two columns 
of benchmark 1 in Table 2). Therefore, by ignoring demographic changes in the rest of 
the world, we underestimate the final impact of population aging on domestic forward-
looking individuals’ living standards. 
  As for the hand-to-mouth group, things are worsened less than in the reference 
scenario (see the two columns of benchmark 1 in Table 2). The smaller reduction in 
physical capital stock and its effect on pre-tax wages have another implication for this 
group; the required reduction in government transfer payments is lower. Here also, the 
reference scenario case overestimates the effect of aging on this group’s living standard.   39
  Finally, we also derive the results for the cases in which either the employee or 
employer pension contribution rate is the only rate that adjusts when the demographic 
structure changes. These results are reported on the second column of benchmarks 2 and 
3, respectively, in both Tables 2 and 3. 
  To sum up, comparisons of the two columns of each benchmark in Table 2 
suggest that by ignoring the impact of the general aging process on the world rate of 
interest, we may systematically overestimate or underestimate the effect which aging 
populations may have on per-capita living standards. As a consequence, policy 
responses – that are designed to offset this effect – may be inappropriate. Therefore, any 
conclusions we make about the implications of population aging on living standards 
should be based on what we believe regarding the effect of aging throughout the world 
on interest rates. Moreover, when domestic population aging is accompanied by aging 
in the rest of the world, and hence a reduction in world real interest rates, changes in the 
country’s net external liabilities are very small (see the last row in Table 3, Col.2 for 
each benchmark). The intuition runs as follows. Broadly speaking, to the extent that 
imbalances in savings and investment – which arise from aging – occur at the global 
level they are likely to be reflected in movements in real interest rates, whereas to the 
extent that they occur in particular regions they will be reflected in changes in net 
foreign asset positions (and exchange rates).
34 In addition, when we compare the second 
column of the three benchmarks in Table 2, it appears again that the results are not 
much affected by whose contribution rate changes, expect for the unemployment rate. 
Also, the hand-to-mouth individuals are those who are most affected by aging. 
  Furthermore, it is conceivable that the pressure on the public pension system due 
to population aging may induce people to postpone their retirement age. But since the 
retirement age is exogenous in this model, the only way we can examine this 
eventuality is to assume a lower increase in the elderly dependency ratio. For example, 
one may assume the limit case where the dependency ratio increases by half of what is 
expected. The results concerning this possibility are presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
                                                 
34 Regional imbalances need not lead to global imbalances if the weight of the region in the world 
economy is small and/or if there are offsetting imbalances in other regions.   40
Although the aging consequences are mitigated in this case, it appears that our basic 
results are not much affected. 
 
8.2 Sensitivity analysis 
  To evaluate the relative influence of selected parameters for model results, we 
have conducted a number of sensitivity tests in the case where both the employee and 
employer pension contribution rates adjust in equal measure as the dependency ratio 
increases. 
  As explained earlier, one unappealing aspect of this model is that we cannot 
simultaneously choose appropriate values for the death probability ( p), retirement age 
(λ ), and the old-age dependency ratio (DR). In our baseline calibration, we have 
chosen sensible values for the first two parameters, and the model generates a 
dependency ratio that corresponds more closely to the overall dependency ratio than to 
the elderly dependency ratio in Canada. Therefore, we have had to raise the pension 
contribution rates such that the individual pension payment (as a proportion of the 
average wage) equals about 21 percent. Since the old-age dependency ratio may give a 
more accurate description of the economic burden arising from population aging, we 
now consider two sets of values for  p and λ  that generate a sensible elderly 
dependency ratio of roughly 25 percent. As a result, we set both pension contribution 
rates at the actual values of 4.5 percent. 
  Parameter Set I involves:  p= 0.04 (which implies a life expectancy of 45 years 
at age 20), λ =40 (as in the baseline calibration), and δ = 0.0165 (a corresponding 
adjustment in the forward-looking rate of time preference that keeps all steady state 
restrictions satisfied). Furthermore, according to Hviding and Mérette (1998, p.7) or 
Mérette (2001, p.56), the elderly dependency ratio in Canada is expected to nearly 
double by 2035. The “shock” to the retirement age that is consistent with this fact is 
dλ =− 10. The simulation results corresponding to this set are reported in Tables 6 and 
7 – lower life expectancy case. 
  Parameter Set II implies: λ =80,  p= 0.02 (as in the baseline calibration), δ = 
0.0215, and dλ =− 20. These results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 – higher retirement 
age case.   41
  When we compare the lower life expectancy and higher retirement age results in 
Table 6, and in turn compare each to the benchmark 1 results in Table 2, the sensitivity 
analyses suggest that our initial findings are fairly robust. 
  Furthermore, calibrations for all aggregative models of this sort are always a 
little strained by the requirement that one interest rate must represent both the net 
marginal product of capital and the rate of return on risk-free government debt. For a 
risky investment, our baseline calibration of the interest rate is relatively small. 
Therefore, we now set the interest and capital depreciation rates (at 8 percent and 3 
percent, respectively) such that the capital-output ratio and capital’s share of output 
remain unaffected (see equation (3)). The results of these simulations are reported in 
Table 8. Again, it appears that our initial findings are truly robust. 
 
9. Conclusion 
  This paper has examined some fiscal, macroeconomic and distributional 
consequences of population aging for a single economy. Our vehicle for addressing 
these issues was a general equilibrium model that involves overlapping generations with 
a public pension system, asymmetric information in the labor market, and a subset of 
households that are liquidity constrained. The analysis leads to three main conclusions. 
  First, it shows that by analyzing the aging problem in a small open-economy 
framework without taking into account its global dimensions, we may systematically 
misestimate the effect which aging may have on the country’s living standards and its 
net foreign asset position. As a result, the scope of policy responses – that are designed 
to ameliorate or offset these effects – may be very inaccurate. 
  Second, the magnitude of the effect of an aging population on people’s average 
living standards, in the short run as well as in the long run, significantly depends on 
whether or not they are liquidity constrained. Nevertheless, on the whole, we should 
regard population aging as an upcoming threat to living standards, and therefore there is 
a need for policy actions that may ameliorate or reverse its effect. 
  Third, the actual incidence of increased contributions to the public pension 
system – that is, whether the workers' or firms' contribution rate should increase to 
maintain the financial viability of the system as the elderly dependency ratio rises – has   42
little effect on the impact of aging on living standards. This conclusion emerges whether 
or not agents save for the future. However, the incidence of contributions (to both the 
public pension and employment insurance programs) matters for labor market 
distortions, and hence for the unemployment rate. More specifically, in contrast to the 
employees', the firms' contribution rates to both programs are shown to have no 
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Figure 1: Dynamic adjustment of domestic (forward-looking group) consumption and financial  
      wealth to an increase in the elderly dependency ratio – with no demographic change  
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Figure 2: Dynamic adjustment of domestic (forward-looking group) consumption and financial  
     wealth to an increase in the elderly dependency ratio – with similar demographic    
      change abroad. 
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Long and Short-Run Effects of Increased Elderly Dependency Ratio 
 
I – Benchmark Simulation Experiments 
 
 
Table 2: Effects of increased elderly dependency ratio on living standards and unemployment 








Benchmark 2   
 
Benchmark 3 





λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
 














ch , long-run effect 
 
-6.91% -10.48%  -7.58% -11.10%  -6.12%  -9.76% 
cl , I and LR effects  -18.54% -14.72%  -17.40% -13.67%  -19.88% -15.94%
 















I: Denotes Impact 
LR: Denotes Long Run 
Benchmark 1: The employee and employer contribution rates adjust (equally) to balance the pension  
plan budget constraint as the dependency ratio increases. 
Benchmark 2: The employee contribution rate alone adjusts to balance the pension plan budget  
constraint as the dependency ratio increases. 
Benchmark 3: The employer contribution rate alone adjusts to balance the pension plan budget  
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Table 3: Effects of increased elderly dependency ratio on wages, capital stock, output and 








Benchmark 2   
 
Benchmark 3 





λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 



















-1.24% +0.70%  +1.15% +2.88%  -4.03%  -1.87% 































∆ : Denotes percentage changes 
 d : Denotes absolute changes 
Benchmark 1: The employee and employer contribution rates adjust (equally) to balance the pension  
plan budget constraint as the dependency ratio increases. 
Benchmark 2: The employee contribution rate alone adjusts to balance the pension plan budget  
constraint as the dependency ratio increases. 
Benchmark 3: The employer contribution rate alone adjusts to balance the pension plan budget  
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Table 4: Effects of increased elderly dependency ratio on living standards and unemployment 








Benchmark 2   
 
Benchmark 3 





λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
 














ch , long-run effect 
 
-3.56% -7.13%  -3.90% -7.42%  -3.15% -6.80% 
cl , I and LR effects  -9.55% -5.72%  -8.96% -5.23%   -10.24% -6.29% 
 


















Table 5: Effects of increased elderly dependency ratio on wages, capital stock, output and 








Benchmark 2   
 
Benchmark 3 





λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 



















-0.64% +1.28%  +0.59% +2.32%  -2.08% +0.08% 






























Note: DR denotes Dependency Ratio 
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II – Sensitivity Analysis Experiments 
Unless otherwise indicated, the sensitivity analyses are conducted in the case where both the 
employee and employer contribution rates adjust (equally) to balance the pension plan budget     
constraint as the dependency ratio increases. 
 
Table 6: Effects of increased elderly dependency ratio on living standards and unemployment 
                rate among low-income workers – lower life expectancy and higher retirement age 








Higher retirement age 





λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
 










ch , long-run effect 
 
-7.32% -10.22%    -4.39% -11.15% 














Table 7: Effects of increased elderly dependency ratio on wages, capital stock, output, and 








Higher retirement age 





λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 















-1.66% +0.22%    -1.66% +0.22% 





















+0.081   7
Table 8: Effects of increased elderly dependency ratio on living standards and unemployment 








S2   
 
S3 





λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
  λ  
shock 
λ and r 
shocks 
 














ch , long-run effect 
 
-3.64% -9.32%  -4.28% -9.90%  -3.00% -8.65% 
cl , I and LR effects  -19.08% -14.74%  -18.00% -13.74%  -20.35% -15.90%
 















S1: The employee and employer contribution rates adjust (equally) to balance the pension plan 
       budget constraint as the dependency ratio increases. 
S2: The employee contribution rate alone adjusts to balance the pension plan budget constraint 
        as the dependency ratio increases. 
S3: The employer contribution rate alone adjusts to balance the pension plan budget constraint 
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Appendix A: 
 
Complete derivation of the simulation model 
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respectively. 






 (from equation (3)), (A3) can be written as: 
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This equation represents the first line in the matrix system.   9
After setting the total differential of the equations (14') and  (15')(in this case, eliminating 
the change in k ), we have respectively 
dd d
d
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These equations correspond respectively to the second and third rows in the matrix system.  
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and 
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These equations stand for the fourth and fifth rows in the matrix system, respectively. 
 
The total differential of the equation (8) is  
 
() d ( 1 −−−− −− ) d 0 = tf u u www w τ θ ε τ             ( A 1 0 )  
 
and it represents the sixth row in the matrix. 
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  Finally, the seventh row in the system is the total differential of the equation (12), which 
is given by 
 
[]
() () ( ) ( ) () ( )
() () ( )
()
τ τ π τ τ π τ τ π
ππ τ τ λ
λ
λ








++ + − − − + −
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Determination of the saddlepath slope and the negative eigenvalue 
 
The solutions of the dynamic system defined by (21) are  












But since σ σ 12 0 .( ) = det Ψ < , we can take σ 1 0 <  and σ 2 0 > . The initial jump to the saddlepath 
means that the unstable root, σ 2 , does not operate, so κ κ 24 0 = = . Further, since equation 
system (21) is linear, so is the saddlepath, equation (22). That equation and the two above are 
consistent if and only if  κ ϕκ 3 = 1 . Thus, once on the saddlepath, the solutions simplify to 












If these two equations and their time derivatives are substituted into system (21) and dλ  is set to 
zero, the result simplifies to 
    [] [] σϕ σ ϕ 11 1         ' ' =Ψ
which can be used to solve for ϕ  and σ 1.  SEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS
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